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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
ARGUMENT
I.

THE LOWER COURT RULING AND ITS RELIANCE ON PENDER V. JACKSON IS CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW AND
SHOULD BE REVERSED.

The Allred Trusts argue that a landlord may not adversely possess property
through a tenant. In making that argument, the Trusts attempt to contradict decades of
settled law. See, e.g., 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 24 ("[T]he possession by a
tenant of the claimant is in law the possession of the claimant," citing numerous cases).
The purpose of the requirement of possession is to ensure that the owner of record title is
on notice that a claimant is asserting ownership.

UTAH REAL PROPERTY LAW

§2.08(a)(5)(iii)atp.89.
Pender v. Jackson, 123 Utah 501, 260 P.2d 542 (1953), upon which the Trusts and
the lower court's decision rely, is easily placed in that context. In Pender, the claimant
did not have physical possession, in person or otherwise. Rather, the claimant merely asserted a subjective intention to develop the property in the future. 260 P.2d at 543. There
was nothing about the claimant's subjective intention that would have placed the owner
on notice of the claim, and thus the claim was invalid.
Pender does not supersede Bozeivich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P.2d 239
(1946), or Adams v. Lamicq, 118 Utah 209, 221 P.2d 1037 (1950). All of the cases cited,
including Pender, are consistent with the requirement that the nature of the adverse possession be such that the record owner have an opportunity to know that a claim is being

made. Here, the Trusts had that opportunity, because David and Inez continued to receive rents on the property and to pay the mortgages and real property taxes on the property for nearly two decades. During that time, they renegotiated the lease on several occasions, and they received rents of $395,000 in excess of the mortgage payments. It is
absurd to contend that the Trusts were not aware of those facts, especially where the trustee prepared the tax returns reporting the income to David and Inez.
II.

THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE SUPPORTS SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DAVID AND INEZ ALLRED ON
THEIR ADVERSE POSSESSION CLAIM.

Arguing from the false premise that the Trusts, and not David and Inez, were the
landlords under the Qwest leases, the Trusts assert that David and Inez were not in possession of the property and thus cannot establish adverse possession. The undisputed
evidence, however, established that David and Inez executed lease amendments with
Qwest in 1987, 1994, and 1999, R. 1992-93, 1995-98, and that each of the leases identified David and Inez Allred as the "Owner." R. 4397, 4468-4508. David and Inez also
received all rents, paid all expenses including mortgages, and exclusively managed the
property. Those facts conclusively established David and Inez' status as the "landlords"
under the Qwest leases, and thus as the possessors of the property. Armed with that evidence, and faced with the Trusts' inability to contradict it, the lower court should have
granted summary judgment in favor of David and Inez on the adverse possession claim.
The Trusts assert that David and Inez could not satisfy the elements of adverse
possession because the quitclaim deeds made the Trusts the landlord to Qwest's tenancy
by operation of law. The Trusts conclude that they formed a landlord/tenant relationship
-2-

with Qwest when David and Inez signed the quitclaim deeds in 1982/83, even though the
Trusts never collected rents or dealt with the tenant in any capacity, and even though
David and Inez executed new leases with Qwest after the conveyances in question. The
execution of the quitclaim deeds, without more, was not enough for the Trusts to form a
landlord/tenant relationship with Qwest and to defeat the adverse possession claim.
A.

Adverse Possession Disregards Record Title and Any Contractual Rights Concerning the Real Property at Issue.

The Trusts assert that David and Inez's adverse possession claim is defeated by
their signatures on the trust documents and quitclaim deeds. The Trusts, however, misunderstand the very nature of adverse possession.
Adverse possession is a statutory remedy in which a claimant obtains record title
to real property by demonstrating the elements of adverse possession. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-12-7. It is not necessary that the claimant show that the title of the record title
holder is invalid and it is understood that every adverse possession claimant must concede that the claimant holds no title and that record title is held in the name of another
party. See, e.g., Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah
1989) (claimant did not dispute that he did not hold record title).
Adverse possession is effective despite prior deeds and other documents executed
by the claimant See Mawson v. Gray, 78 Utah 542, 6 P.2d 157, 159-160 (1931). In
Mawson, two brothers, Oliver and Robert, together cultivated ten acres of land owned by
Oliver. Approximately nine years before Robert's death, Oliver deeded five acres of the
land to Robert. At Robert's death, however, Oliver, "under claim of ownership, contin-
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ued in possession of the property until he conveyed it to [his son], and until then exclusively possessed it as his own." 6 P.2d at 159. In finding that Oliver had established title
by adverse possession to the five acres that Oliver had previously deeded to Robert, the
court found that "Oliver occupied and possessed the property, not as an heir of Robert,
but under claim that he was the owner of it, notwithstanding the prior deed from Oliver to
Robert." Id.
Here, as in Mawson, David and Inez occupied and possessed the Provo Property
through their tenant as the owners of the property, notwithstanding the prior quitclaim
deeds and trust documents. Thus, David and Inez's adverse possession claim is not affected by the quitclaim deeds, the terms of the Trusts, or any recognition that record title
is not held in their names. See Sheppick v. Sheppick, 44 Utah 131, 138 P. 1169, 1171
(1914) (presumption of possession in favor of record title holder overcome when the adverse claimant repudiates the title of the record title holder).
B.

Qwest and the Trusts Never Entered Into a Landlord/Tenant
Relationship.

"Attornment is the act of a person who holds a leasehold interest, or estate for life
or years, by which he agrees to become the tenant of a stranger who has acquired the fee
in the land, or the remainder or reversion, or the right to the rent or services by which the
tenant holds. It is an act by which a tenant acknowledges his obligation to a new landlord." Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 269-70 n.2
(Utah 1996) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 130 (6th ed. 1990)).

-4-

Qwest and the Trusts stipulated in the Third Amendment to Lease signed by them
in June 2000 that "notice of [the quitclaim deeds] was not provided to [Qwest] prior to
this Third Amendment and Tenant has continued to enter into leases with the original
owners, David H. Alhed and Inez H. Allred." R. 1896-97. There is no question that
Qwest did not "acknowledge [its] obligation to a new landlord;" rather, Qwest admittedly
"continued to enter into leases with the original owners," David and Inez. Hence, the
Trusts never formed a landlord/tenant relationship with Qwest and David and Inez's landlord/tenant relationship with Qwest remained unchallenged. Morever, Qwest remained
David and Inez's tenant until June 2000.
C.

To the Extent the Trusts Formed a Landlord/Tenant Relationship With Qwest by Reason of the Quitclaim Deeds, David
and Inez Immediately Ousted the Trusts from Any Such Relationship.

Even if the Court accepts the Trusts' assertion that the quitclaim deeds were sufficient to create a landlord/tenant relationship between Qwest and the Trusts, David and
Inez ousted the Trusts from this relationship immediately after the quitclaim deeds were
signed.
"To ripen into title, it is necessary that an adverse claimant's possession operate as
an ouster of the possession of the true owner." Adams v. Lamicq, 221 P.2d at 1040. A
landlord/tenant relationship arises where the landlord accepts rent payment from a tenant.
See Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc., 560 P.2d 700, 701
(Utah 1977). Indeed, "no more affirmative act of ownership can be asserted than the col-
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lection of the rents thereon." Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of the City of
St. Louis v. Zitko, 386 S.W.2d 69, 83 (Mo. 1964) (en banc).
Not only did the Trusts fail to establish a landlord/tenant relationship with Qwest
after the quitclaim deeds were signed, David and Inez ousted the Trusts from any such relationship by 1) collecting and using without limitation all rents that Qwest paid,
2) entering into multiple subsequent leases with Qwest, 3) paying all income taxes on the
rental income, and 4) exclusively conducting all communications and correspondence
with Qwest.
In contrast, it is undisputed that the Trusts never had any communication with
Qwest, R. 1896-97, the Trusts never received any rents from the Property until August
2000, R. 4393-97, 1896-97, the Trusts ratified David and Inez's claim of rental income
and payment of income taxes from the rents, R. 1896-97, and the Trusts never entered
into a lease with Qwest until June 2000, R. 1896-97.
The Trusts also assert that the lower court could have relied on Bates 0771 to find
an issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Bates 0771, however, does not
raise any issues of material fact because it does not reference the Trusts, there is no testimony to interpret it or give it meaning, and it does not challenge the undisputed fact that
David and Inez controlled all aspects of the Provo Property and the position of landlord
to Qwest's tenancy. Indeed, Bates 0771 supports the fact that David and Inez controlled
the collection and disbursements of rents, the execution of all leases and communications
with Qwest, and the reporting of all income from the Provo Property for a number of
years following recording of the quitclaim deeds.
-6-

Based on the undisputed facts, if the Trusts ever had a landlord/tenant relationship
with Qwest, David and Inez quickly ousted the Trusts and formed their own landlord/tenant relationship with Qwest beginning in 1983. There is no issue of fact precluding summary judgment in favor of David and Inez and judgment should be entered in
their favor.
D.

There Is No Evidence That David and Inez Held the Provo
Property by Permission from the Trusts and the Lower
Court's Exclusion of the Only Testimony Concerning Permission Has Not Been Appealed.

The Trusts assert that David and Inez's adverse possession claim fails because
David and Inez's possession was by express permission from the Trusts. The Trusts fail
to support this allegation with any citation to the record because the lower court precluded such testimony. The Trusts attempted to present testimony to the lower court of
an alleged "secret agreement" between the Trusts and David Allred in which Richard G.
Allred alleged that David Allred expressly performed all actions of the landlord with
Qwest as the agent of the Trusts. R. 4333-90. The lower court excluded any evidence of
any such "secret agreement." R. 6123-27. The Trusts have not appealed the lower
court's exclusion of this testimony and there is no evidence that David and Inez's conduct
regarding the Property and Qwest was by express permission. Hence, the undisputed
evidence remains that David and Inez's possession, occupation, and conduct establishing
adverse possession was in their own right and not by permission.

-7-

III.

REVERSAL OF THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS TO DAVID AND INEZ'S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY
DUTY, FRAUD, CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT, AND PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIMS IS WARRANTED.

The Trusts maintain that the lower court's entry of judgment on David and Inez's
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, constructive trust, declaratory judgment, and punitive
damage claims is proper for the following reasons: First, the Trusts assert that David and
Inez failed to raise equitable estoppel and equitable tolling (also known as the "special
circumstances exception") before the lower court. Next, the Trusts assert that tolling of
the statute of limitations is improper under either equitable tolling or equitable estoppel
because David and Inez were aware of the facts underlying their claims well before they
filed their complaint. Finally, the Trusts assert that summary judgment was appropriate
based on an alleged lack of merit in David and Inez's breach of fiduciary duty and fraud
claims and based on alleged inconsistencies in Inez's testimony before the lower court.
As set forth below, each of those assertions lacks merit.
A.

David and Inez Properly Raised Equitable Estoppel and Equitable Tolling as a Defense to the Trusts' Motion for Summary Judgment Based on the Statute of Limitations.

David and Inez raised equitable estoppel and equitable tolling as defenses to the
Trusts' motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, at R. 5550-51.

-8-

B.

David and Inez Presented Evidence Supporting Application of
Both Equitable Tolling and Equitable Estoppel Which Precludes Summary Judgment on These Defenses.

The Trusts assert that David and Inez cannot establish equitable estoppel or equitable tolling because "David Allred was fully cognizant of the circumstances, had advice
and counsel from his attorney, threatened legal action, and allowed the statute to run having full knowledge of the quitclaim deeds, the Trusts, and their effect." Appellee's Brief
at 30.
The equitable tolling or the special circumstances exception tolls the statute of
limitations "in exceptional circumstances where the application of the general rule would
be 'irrational' or 'unjust.'" Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). To establish equitable estoppel, "'it is enough if the party has been induced to refrain from using such means or taking such action as lay in his power, by
which he might have retrieved his position and saved himself from loss.'" Rice v. Granite Sch. Dist, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159, 162 (1969) (citation omitted). Whether estoppel bars a defendant's statute of limitations defense depends on the facts and circumstances giving rise to the claimed estoppel. Id. at 163. Hence, "determining . .. whether
a plaintiff acted reasonably under the circumstances [is a] fact-intensive inquir[y] that
'precludefs judgment as a matter of law] in all but the clearest of cases.'" In re
Malualani B. Hoopiiaina Trust v. Hoopiiaina, 2006 UT 53, f 37, 144 P.3d 1129 (quoting
Russell Packard Dev.} Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, f39, 108 P.3d 741 (alteration in
original) (quoting Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996)).
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Here, the lower court, although it never addressed equitable estoppel or the special
circumstances objection, relied on several letters by David and Inez in order to reach the
conclusion that the statute of limitations barred all of David and Inez's claims other than
adverse possession. The letters, however, were only a small portion of the evidence presented to the lower court on the issue whether the statute of limitations was tolled. The
lower court failed to recognize the evidence showing the following circumstances during
the relevant time:
1.

Preparation of tax returns. Richard G. Allred prepared David and

Inez's tax returns for many years. For 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 (signed in 1998), he
asserted in those returns that David and Inez were entitled to the income from the Provo
Property. David and Inez relied on the Trusts' concession that David and Inez were the
rightful owners of the rental income in not pursuing legal action sooner.
2.

Trusts' misleading conduct. The trustees of the Trusts, Richard G.

Allred and Mary Lee Allred, ratified and acknowledged that Qwest had never dealt with
the Trusts and had no knowledge of the Trusts prior to entering into the Third Amendment to Lease. R. 1896-97. Also, prior to August 2000, the Trusts never asserted any
claim to ownership of the rents produced by the Provo Property.
3.

Richard G. Allred's conduct. In representations to David and Inez,

Richard G. Allred led and induced his parents to believe that a resolution would be accomplished without legal action. Richard now denies any such representation. David
and Inez reasonably relied on Richard's representation to their detriment and the Trusts
should now be estopped from repudiating this representation.
-10-

4.

Richard G. Alfred's relationship. Throughout the period preceding

the 1982/83 quitclaim deeds through June 2000, Richard G. Allred was diligent in maintaining a confidential and fiduciary relationship with his parents. In particular, following
David and Inez's demand for return of title to the Provo Property after 1991, Richard
continued his relationship with his parents by preparing their tax returns through taxable
year 1997, continuing to visit them regularly and perform maintenance of their home and
cars, and continuing to provide them with legal advice on taxes and other topics. Despite
this continued relationship, the Trusts now assert that David and Inez should have sued
the Trusts and their son earlier.
The foregoing evidence precluded the court from granting summary judgment on
the statute of limitations defense. The Trusts cannot take steps and make representations
that reasonably induced David and Inez's forbearance, and then reverse those steps and
representations once the limitations period has run.
C.

The Merits of David and Inez's Claims Are Not at Issue on
Appeal and Should Be Resolved by a Jury.

The Trusts apparently assert that David and Inez's claims of fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty lack merit and Inez's testimony is unreliable. The merits of David and
Inez's fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims were never addressed by the lower court.
The parties briefed the facts and law concerning fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, but
the lower court determined that those claims were barred by the statute of limitations and
never made any findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning those claims. They are
appropriately left to the trier of fact on remand.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, appellants request that this Court reverse the decision of
the lower court and remand the case for entry of judgment in favor of the appellants on
their adverse possession claim; and for trial of appellants' breach of fiduciary duty, fraud,
constructive trust, declaratory judgment, and punitive damages claims.
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BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEES ON "CROSS-APPEAL OF OVERRULING
OF FINAL JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE"
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The Trusts' cross-appeal challenges the lower court's rejection of the Trusts'
claim for an accounting of all rent paid to David and Inez under the leases. The lower
court found, following an evidentiary hearing, that the claim was barred by waiver, estoppel, and failure to establish grounds justifying an accounting. The following issues
are presented:
1.

Did the lower court abuse its discretion in reopening the issues of waiver,

estoppel, and entitlement to an accounting after Judge Stott issued his Memorandum Decision, but before final judgment was entered? "The question of whether to grant a motion for a new trial is within the discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless the facts show a clear abuse of discretion."

Chournos v.

D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1982). Moreover, "[bjecause trial courts are under
no obligation to consider motions for reconsideration, any decision to address or not to
address the merits of such a motion is highly discretionary." Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins.
Co., 2007 UT 37, f 15 (citation omitted). A trial court's grant of a motion to reconsider
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and "may be overturned only 'if there
is no reasonable basis for the decision." Id. (quoting Langeland v. Monarch Motors, 952
P.2d 1058,1061 (Utah 1998)).
2.

Does substantial evidence support the lower court's decision that the Trusts

waived any right to the rents? "Whether a party has effectuated a waiver is a mixed ques-13-

tion of law and fact."

United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain

Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f 21, 140 P.3d 1200 (citations omitted). "'Whether the trial court
employed the proper standard of waiver presents a legal question which is reviewed for
correctness, but the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature
and should be reviewed as factual determinations.'" Id. (quoting Pledger v. Gillespie,
1999 UT 54,116, 982 P.2d 572). Accordingly, this Court "'grant[s] broadened discretion to the trial court's findings' when reviewing questions of waiver." Id. (quoting Chen
v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 23, 100 P.3d 1177). "A trial court's findings of fact will not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous." Chen, 2004 at \ 19 (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)).
SUMMARY O F A R G U M E N T

The foundation of the Trusts' cross appeal is the incorrect argument that an interlocutory decision of the trial court is not subject to revision prior to the entry of final
judgment. Numerous cases contradict the Trusts' position. Interlocutory rulings of the
district court are subject to revision at any time prior to entry of judgment, and a decision
to reconsider a previous ruling lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. No
abuse of that discretion has been shown in this case. Judge Schof ield correctly decided
that Judge Stott had erred in refusing to consider evidence of waiver and estoppel, and allowed the issue to be reopened because, "I think Judge Stott has placed this case in a
place of circumstance where there's a significant likelihood of reversal, and I would just
as soon fix it."
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to the rents and obligated to pay the income tax on those rents. He also allowed his par• - engages and other expenses, and to exercise control over
the excess funds.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED NO PROCEDURAL ERROR IN RECONSIDERING THE WAIVER DEFENSE.

While this case was pending in the district court, it was assigned to two different
judges. R. 7194-98 and 8033-48. The case was first assigned to Judge Schofield in 2001,
it was rotated to Judge Stott in 2003, and it rotated back to Judge Schofield in 2005.
R. 1207-08, 5904-10, 8081-85. In particular, the Trusts object to Judge Schofield's reconsideration of Judge Stott's September 22, 2004 oral ruling.
Judge Stott held an evidentiary hearing on September 22, 2004 on the Trusts' accounting counterclaim. R. 8168. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Stott ruled
orally that Trusts were entitled to a judgment against David and Inez in the amount of
$127,800. R. 8168:108-9. Judge Stott found that David and Inez had stipulated to owing
the Trusts $395,814.95, reduced to $127,800 based on application of the statute of limitations, and precluded David and Inez from presenting evidence of or maintaining waiver
and estoppel affirmative defenses. R. 8168:19-31. No such stipulation was made, however. David and Inez simply acknowledged that the difference between the rents collected and amounts paid on the mortgages from 1983 to 2000 was $395,814.95.
Later on the day of the hearing, the Trusts filed a written motion for prejudgment
interest. R. 6935-40. Approximately two weeks after the hearing, the Trusts filed a motion for reconsideration of Judge Stott's ruling concerning the statute of limitations.
R. 6998-7018. Briefing on the motions was concluded by early November and thereafter
in November counsel sent a proposed order concerning the September 22, 2004 hearing
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have them in my view a likely reversal on that point. I simply think that by
not allowing that issue to be resolved, I think Judge Stott has placed this
case in a place of circumstance where there's a significant likelihood of reversal, and I would just as soon fix it.

My view is that Judge Stott simply didn't let you get in any of those affirmative defenses. I think you're entitled to have a hearing on them. We
have talked largely about setoff because that's the one that's certainly . . .
well we have talked about them but I'm going to allow you to put on evidence on any of those affirmative defenses that were not raised in front of
Judge Stott in September of last year. Statute of limitations law, we're not
going back there.
R. 8176:40,42.
A.

The Timeliness of David and Inez's Motion for New Trial Is
Irrelevant Because the Lower Court Could Appropriately
Modify Its Previous Orders.

The foregoing facts demonstrate that David and Inez's motion for new trial was
timely filed. UTAH R. CiV. P. 59(b) provides that a motion for new trial shall be filed
"not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment." In this case, no final judgment
was rendered which could have triggered the 10-day time limit prior to the filing of the
motion. A motion for new trial filed before a final judgment is considered timely filed.
See, e.g., Regan v. Blount, 1999 UT App 153, f 6, 978 P.2d 1051.
More to the point, "[t]rial courts have clear discretion to reconsider and change
their position with respect to any orders or decisions as long as no final judgment has
been rendered." Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 118, 48
P.3d968
We have interpreted Rule 54(b) to allow "a [trial] court to change its
position with respect to any order or decision before a final judgment has
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been render*-d in the case.
nminiy v. Mrs. tieia* u ^ / o , iwi i .id
1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); accord Timm v. Dewsnup. 851 T\2d
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thus subject to revision); Kennedy [v. Afew Ern /'.v/m. ,//ZC], 600 l\2d i ^ Uj
at 536-37 [Utah 1979]; Salt Lake City Corp. . ' imes Constructors, Inc.,
761 P.2d 42, 44 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (stating "Rule 54(b) allows courts
to readjust prior rulings in . . . cases . . . unless those rulings disposed of entire claims or parties and those rulings were specifically certified as final").
' motion to revise was properly before the trial court pursuant
to Kuie D4(D). Because a final judgment had not yet been rendered disposing of all of the parties chums (i.e., Reagan's counterclaim was outstanding), the court had the power to revise its summary judgment order
i Ral 51(b). Sei\ <'.#.. Ih>n Houston, VI ')., In< v. Intermountain
Health Care, Inc., 933 IV.d M)\ 406 (Utah ( ; App 1W7» -providing
judgment is not a final, appealable order if it does not dispose of all the
claims in -> -^.~ : - hiding counterclaims").
T

~ P > '.. Inc.

• General, Inc., 1999 UT App 303, m 5v5*. {)9() P W >:
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liere, each ui the rulings the Trusts assert were erroneouslv modified b} die lower
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Because no final judgment was at issue

with regard to David and Inez's motion for i)i'\\ dial Rule i'l vv is IK»I unplu ah ill mil ill
lower court appropriately modified the rulings under Rule 54(b).
In the present case, pec... .e Judge Lewis never signed an order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment nor entered judgment thereon,
plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was, in essence, not a motion for reconsideration at all, but simply a reargument of their opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment, which a trial court is free to enters....
at any point prior to entry of a final order or judgment. See, e.g., Bennion w
Hansen. 6W P.2d 757. 760 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, ii A as not improper
for the trial oM>,*t
w \ l - plaintiffs' motion or for ;hi * court to consider
it on apnea I.
Ron Shepherd Ins.
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Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 n.4 (1994); accord, Timm v.
-
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(I Jtah 1993) (permitting reconsideration of summary

!
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judgment under Rule 54(b) and holding summary judgment did not fully dispose of case
when part of counterclaim remained in trial court, and was thus subject to revision); Salt
Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
("Rule 54(b) allows courts to readjust prior rulings in . . . cases . . . unless those rulings
disposed of entire claims or parties and those rulings were specifically certified as final").1
B.

The Law of the Case Doctrine Does Not Preclude One Judge
from Reconsidering the Ruling of Another Where the Change
in Judge Assignment Is Caused By Rotation.

The Trusts assert that Judge Schofield's modification of rulings made by Judge
Stott violated the "law of the case" doctrine. In this case, however, Judge Schofield and
Judge Stott were judges in the same case and are considered to be a single judicial officer. "Law of the case applies only to final determinations and 'does not prevent a judge
from reconsidering his or her previous nonfinal order.'" State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694,
697 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (1993) (quoting Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d
734, 739-40 (Utah 1990)).
The Utah Court of Appeals has specifically held that rotation of judge assignments
in the Fourth District does not implicate the law of the case doctrine because the judges

Because the lower court was free to amend its own order under Rule 54(b), it is irrelevant whether David and Inez failed to timely draft a written order. The lower court's decision to address the merits of David and Inez's motion was "highly discretionary" and
the Allred Trusts have not presented any law or evidence that the court abused its discretion in any way. See Tschaggeny, 2007 UT at 15-16. In any event, the procedural record
establishes that the Allred Trusts contributed to any delay in producing a written order.
Also, the Allred Trusts had an opportunity to bring any alleged delay to the attention of
the lower court at a hearing held December 17, 2004 and did not.
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things, sets forth the following support for the determination that the Trusts waived any
right to rents from 1983, when they received record title, to August 2000 when they first
received any rents:
4.
Following conveyance of the Provo Property to the Trusts,
plaintiffs continued to receive all rents from the Provo Property and to pay
all expenses of the property and expenses were reimbursed to plaintiffs by
the tenant. Plaintiffs made all mortgage payments due on the property.
10.
By 1992, Richard G. Allred, who has the sole trustee of eight
of the trusts and the beneficiary of the ninth trust from 1982 until present,
was well aware that his parents made a claim to the property even though it
was titled in the name of the trusts.
11.
By 1992 and 1993, Richard G. Allred was well aware that his
parents were claiming ownership to the property and that the quitclaim
deeds had been submitted in error or by some kind of fraud or deceit.
15.
The Allred Trusts knew or should have known from at least
by 1994 that plaintiffs claimed the rents as their own property because
defendant Richard G. Allred prepared and signed plaintiffs' tax returns as a
"paid preparer" in 1994, 1996, and 1997, and as "preparer" in 1995. The
tax returns prepared by Richard G. Allred for the years 1994, 1995, 1996,
and 1997 reported that the rents and expenses related to the Provo Property
belonged to plaintiffs.
16.

Plaintiffs received all rents from the property until August

2000.
24.
Richard G. Allred knew that the Allred Trusts were the owners of the Provo Property and as the owners would be entitled to the benefits of ownership, including rents. This was a matter of considerable discussion between him and his parents and some very unhappy and angry letters from his parents.
25.
Despite having knowledge that the Allred Trusts had rights,
or at least could make a claim of ownership to the rents, Richard G. Allred
prepared and signed, as preparer, ("paid preparer" in 1994, 1996, and 1997,
and as "preparer" in 1995) his parents' tax returns in 1994, 1995, 1996, and
1997 in which his parents claimed the rents from the Provo Property as
their own personal income.
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A party who fails to marshal the evidence faces "grim consequences." United
Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f 27, 140
P.3d 1200. Where an appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the Court need not consider
that challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the findings. See Tanner v.
Carter, 2001 UT 18, f 17, 20 P.3d 332. Rather, the Court assumes that the record supports the findings of the lower court. See State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 490 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
The Trusts have entirely failed to marshal the evidence in favor of the lower
court's ruling that the Trusts' accounting claim was barred by waiver. "What [the Trusts
have] done instead is 'merely re-argue the factual case . . . presented in the trial court,'
leaving [David and Inez] and this court to bear the expense and time of performing the
critical task of marshaling the evidence. This is unfair, inefficient, and unacceptable."
United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35, f 26, quoting Chen, 2004 UT 82, f 77. This Court
should, therefore, sustain the lower court's order regarding waiver without consideration
of the Trusts' challenge on appeal.
B.

The Lower Court's Ruling on the Trusts' Accounting Counterclaim Is Warranted For Reasons the Trusts Have Not Appealed.

The Trusts appear to challenge only the lower court's determination that the accounting counterclaim was barred due to waiver. The lower court, however, determined
that the accounting claim was barred based on waiver, estoppel, and failure to present any
"basis on which to base a claim for an accounting either in equity or at law." R. 8037-39.
Because the Trusts do not challenge the alternate bases on which the lower court barred
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wl. as trustee, knew that

his parents claimed ownership. He prepared and signed r-'vn •
rents belonged to his parents, and with all of that knowledge and more allowed his par-

In the face of the above findings (In1 husls hil,l\uiiil<) i^cit lli.il assignment « I
rents to the Trusts contained in the trust documents David and Inez signed in 1982 could

not be waived by the trustees. The Trusts fail to cite any authority to support that position and the proposition is contrary to Utah law. Cf., CCD, L.C. v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42,
^[34, 116 P.3d 366 (party waived first claim by entering into an amended agreement but
did not waive subsequent claim).
The Trusts also assert that any waiver commenced by the trustees' acts ended
when the trustees stopped preparing the tax returns in tax year 1997 (signed in 1998). By
that time, however, the Trusts had already waived their rights, if any, to rents and after
1997 never asserted any right to the rents until August 2000. Hence, the Trusts' waiver
continued until August 2000 when the Trusts challenged David and Inez's receipt of the
rents.
Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court's factual finding of waiver is supported by substantial evidence in the record and should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's rejection of the
Trusts' claim for accounting and reimbursement of rents.
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• iiiiisolitkital uise involving appellees

T-^ci* Trustee for the David 11. Alfred Exemption Trust and M~
-. i.<*. .cieued to herein as "Jensen"). R. 388.

uvair^ tTi \ ; ; '

N

Jensen brought a .omplann

. :ig real property located in Bountiful,

Li ah held by Jensen (the "Bountiful property"). R. 6.
Jensen has held title to the Bountiful property since 1992, R, 4-5. On January 16,
1992, I )ii\ ml 11 All i il .iiiil M.iiiii 11 , 'illit'tl i vecuted a quitclaim deed conveying title to
the Bountiful property to the David H. and Mary ' *

*

!

at lhe Davis County Recorder's office on June 8, 2001, entry no. 1666725, book 2824,

"1

" Unless otherwise designated, all citation to the record in 'this Brief of Cross-Appellees
on "Cross-Appeal of Summary Judgment in Consolidated Case" refers to the record for
Case No. 05042290 and not the record concerning Case No. 010400765 with which this
matter was consolidated for -nrnose^ . T .moeal.

page 93. On January 17, 2003, Mary A. Jensen, trustee for the David H. and Mary H.
Allred Trust, transferred an undivided 1/2 interest in the Bountiful Property to Mary A.
Jensen, Trustee of the David H. Allred Exemption Trust; and an undivided 1/2 interest in
the Bountiful Property to Mary A. Jensen, Trustee of the Mary H. Allred Survivor's
Trust. None of the referenced trusts were parties to the underlying action in Utah
County.
On December 30, 2004 the Allred Trusts filed with the Davis County Recorder a
"Notice of Action Pending." encumbering the title to the Bountiful property. R. 145-46;
Cross-Appellant's Addendum M. The Notice of Action Pending contains a pleading caption in the case between David and Inez Allred and the Allred Trusts that is the subject of
the consolidated appeal as Case No. 010400765. R. 145-46. The Notice of Action Pending purports to give notice that the Bountiful property is subject to a judgment held by the
Allred Trusts against David and Inez and warning that "any transfer, conveyance, or encumbrance may be considered by the Court to be a violation of a Universal Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act, and any parties considering any of the above-mentioned actions are
hereby put on notice." R. 145.
In January 2005, Jensen demanded that the Allred Trusts remove the Notice of Action Pending on the basis that it was an invalid lis pendens that clouded the title to the
Bountiful property. R. 140-41. The Allred Trusts refused. Jensen thereafter filed a
complaint in Davis County, Utah for removal of the Notice of Action Pending and for
slander of title. R. 1-6. The Davis County Court transferred the lis pendens action to
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Utah County to be heard by the sanx- incite presiding i n er lln .u lion In. (ween David and
Inez M\d (he Allred Trusts. R. 242.
.-. '/cpteiiiDor.
Pend •.-.: . d

.•• • Jensen moved the Court for release of the Notice *»f Action

•

i I'liu/ut, I*!.

III. In granting summary judgment and or-

dering the release of the Notice of Action Pend i n LV • • =

:

a
^ U J ! Defendant's "Notice of Action Pending" recorded -v ;;n
the Davis County Recorder is a lis pendens within the meaning of \ \.\h
( V d c A i ^ ^ 7H--!(V^ , r u n 78-40-2 ^;
\Iten Defendants filed their Notice 01 Action Pending
on December 30. 20(K m judgment existed t r winch Defendants could
reasonably rely in filing the Notice of Action Pending:
..;«.
ol Action Pending

i

•

tnnji uic A*,.ice

d
tun the fact that a lis pendens had been recorded against the
Provo property in Utah County was irrelevant to whether Defendants were
entitled to file a lis pendens against the Bountiful property;
e.
-:ai I he records are clear that at the time Defendant:- *.•
corded the Notice of Action Pending, the record owners of the Bountiful
property were not parties to the action pending before this Court in l/iah
County; and
f.
That according to the Utah lis pendens statute, utu .ney's fees
and costs are warranted in this matter because Defendants did not have substantial justification for recording the Notice ot Acti< n. Fending and no
other circumstances rxist that would make the imposition of attorney's fees
and costs unjust
R. 348-49 (Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Release of Lis Pendens and for Summ.'ii •

'Ci;;. . ..^ciiLLi to this Brief as Addendum B) As a ^csulL the lower Court di-

rected that in. \' •

*

nit I" iiinliii;" be I i u i s u

fees and costs in favor of Mary A. Jensen, R. 349.
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..,:•. , .in award or attorney's

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The lower court correctly held that the "Notice of Action Pending" was an improper lis pendens. No provision of the Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes proceedings
to collect upon a judgment before the judgment has been entered. The Allred Trusts'
claim that UTAH R. CiV. P. 7(f)(1) authorizes encumbering property prior to entry of final
judgment was not raised in the court below and in any event is contrary to the entire
structure of the Rules. The Rules plainly contemplate that only written, final judgments
may serve as the basis for actions to collect a judgment.
More importantly, the Bountiful property was not owned by the putative judgment
debtors and had not been owned by them since 1992. No action to establish a fraudulent
conveyance was ever filed. The Allred Trusts thus had no justification for attempting to
cloud the title to that property, and the lower court correctly held that Notice to be an improper lis pendens and correctly required the Allred Trusts to pay Jensen's attorney's fees
in removing the cloud from the title.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE ALLRED TRUSTS' ASSERTION THAT THEIR "NOTICE
OF ACTION PENDING" WAS RECORDED PURSUANT TO
RULE 7(f)(1), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, IN FURTHERANCE OF A COLLECTION OF A DEBT IS RAISED FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

The Allred Trusts assert that the Notice of Action Pending does not violate UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 78-40-2 (the "Lis Pendens Statute"), because it was filed pursuant to UTAH

R. Civ. P. 7(f)(1), in furtherance of the collection of a debt. The Allred Trusts also appear to assert that the notice was properly filed pursuant to a judgment. The Allred
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Trusts, however, never raised these issues before the lower court and are barred from
raising them for the first time on appeal. In re Schwenke, 2004 UT 17, f 34, 89 P.3d 117
("It is well-established that we generally will not address issues raised for the first time
on appeal.") (citation omitted); Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392,
395 (Utah 1980) ("As a general rule, an issue raised initially in a reply brief will not be
considered on appeal.. ..").
II.

THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE ALLRED TRUSTS' "NOTICE OF ACTION PENDING" VIOLATED
THE LIS PENDENS STATUTE.

The Allred Trusts arguments to justify their filing of the "Notice of Action Pending" are frivolous. The Allred Trusts did not have a judgment, had no interest in the
Bountiful property, and took no steps to establish that the property, which David and Inez
had not owned in their own names since 1992, should be available under the Fraudulent
Conveyance Act to satisfy an alleged "judgment" entered against David and Inez in 2004.
Judge Stott's September 22, 2004 decision was not a judgment. A "judgment" is
"a decree and any order from which an appeal lies." UTAH R. Civ. P. 54(a). The rule
plainly contemplates a written document, not an oral statement of the Court.
The provisions of UTAH R. Civ. P. 7(f)(1) governing orders also plainly contemplate written orders:
An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. . . .
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If this rule permitted writs of execution to be issued based upon oral statements of the
court which have not even been reduced to written form, let alone signed by the court or
final for purposes of appeal, then a party subject to an adverse order which is not final
and cannot be appealed would nevertheless be subject to execution and collection proceedings. That is in effect what the Allred Trusts attempted to do here. Such a procedure
would circumvent UTAH R. ClV. P. 62(a), which provides that no execution may issue on
a judgment until 10 days after its entry, and UTAH R. ClV. P. 64E(a), which provides, "A
writ of execution is available . . . following entry of a final judgment
In order to properly pursue a judgment against real property, the judgment holder
is required to file a copy of the judgment or abstract of judgment with the county recorder.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-22-l(7)(a). The Allred Trusts did not file a copy of a

judgment or an abstract of a judgment because none existed. Their inability to comply
with the statute belies their claim that an enforceable judgment existed.
More importantly, the attempt to encumber the Bountiful property was improper
because the putative judgment debtors had conveyed the property to Jensen as trustee 12
years earlier. The Allred Trusts attempt to bridge that gaping legal chasm with the naked
conclusion that the 1992 transfer violated the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 25-6-1 et seq. Setting aside the facial absurdity of such a claim in connection with an action filed in 2001, nine years after the transfer, no finding of violation of
the Act had been made or even requested at the time the Notice of Action Pending was
filed, or at any time thereafter. The property of third parties is not available to satisfy a
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judgment simply because the judgment creditor believes it should be, and it was improper
for the Allred Trusts to attempt to encumber that property.
The trial court correctly deemed the Notice of Action Pending to be an unlawful
lis pendens which violated UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-40-1 et seq. Under that statute, the
court must order a notice released if "the court finds that the claimant has not established
by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim that is
the subject of the notice." Id. § 78-40-2.5(3). The court in the present case correctly
made such a finding.
The statute also provides that "[a] court shall award costs and attorney fees to a
prevailing party on any motion under this section unless the court finds that: (a) the nonprevailing party acted with substantial justification; or (b) other circumstances make the
imposition of attorney fees and costs unjust." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-40-2.5(7).
The lower court found that attorney's fees were warranted because "when the [Allred Trusts] filed their Notice of Action Pending on December 30, 2004, no judgment existed on which [the Allred Trusts] could reasonably rely in filing the Notice of Action
Pending." R. 350. The court also found that the Allred Trusts had "no reasonable basis
for filing the Notice of Action Pending," R. 350, and that the "records are clear that at the
time [the Allred Trusts] recorded the Notice of Action Pending, the record owners of the
Bountiful Property were not parties to the action pending before" the lower court in Utah
County. R. 349. Those findings were in accordance with law and supported by substantial evidence.
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Pursuant to the Lis Pendens Statute, Jensen is entitled to attorney's fees and costs
related to the Allred Trusts cross-appeal concerning the lis pendens matter. Jensen, therefore, requests this Court's order remanding the issue of attorney's fees on appeal to the
lower court for determination of the amount of attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the lower court's judgment in
the consolidated case.
DATED this 2?%ay of June, 2007.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Michael R. Carlston
Kenneth L. Reich
Attorneys for Appellants and
Cross-Appellees
C \DOCUMENTS AND SETTINGS\RRP\DESKTOP\REPLY BRIEFDOC 6/27/07

-34-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANTS/BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEES were served by U.S. Mail on June
27, 2007 as follows:
RICHARD G ALLRED
1660 W BROADWAY APT 302
ANAHEIM CA 92802-1147
MARY LEE ALLRED
1527 VINEYARD DR
BOUNTIFUL UT 84010-1333
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ADDENDUM

A.

Order on Accounting Counterclaim, October 13, 2005

B.

Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Release of Lis Pendens
and for Summary Judgment, January 12, 2006

ADDENDUM A

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

lii-i-^QS:
v_>4*
CORY D. MEMMOTT, #8346
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
Fax:
(801) 531-9747
Attorneys for counter claim defense
of Inez H. Allred
Michael R. Carlston, #0577
Kenneth L. Reich, #8578
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11 t h Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID H. ALLRED, e t a /

ORDER ON ACCOUNTING
COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 010400765
vs.

DIVISION #8

RICHARD G. ALLRED, e t a / ,
Defendants.

This case came on regularly for hearing and trial concerning
defendants' accounting counterclaim before the Court on September 22,
2005 and July 20, 2005. Plaintiff Inez H. Allred and Mary Allred Jensen, as

Deputy

personal representative of the Estate of David H. Allred, ("Plaintiffs") were
represented by their counsel, Michael R. Carlston of Snow, Christensen &
Martineau. Cory D. Memmott of Plant, Christensen & Kanell appeared on the
counterclaim defense of Inez H. Allred. Richard G. Allred, as trustee for the
Richard Mark Allred Trust, the Robert Matthew Allred Trust, the Mary
Michelle Allred Trust, the Michael Christopher Allred Trust, the Stephen
James Allred Trust, the Karen Allred Trust, the Nathan Allred Trust, the Mary
Allred Trust, and Mary Lee Allred, trustee for the Richard G. Allred Trust
appeared on behalf of the nine "Allred Trusts."
Having reviewed the briefs and oral arguments of the parties,
testimony of witnesses, and exhibits presented, the Court now makes the
following findings of fact:
FINDINGS
1.

OF FACT

Plaintiffs entered into a lease of real property located in Provo,

Utah County, State of Utah (the "Provo Property"), with Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph in 1973 as tenant, and which the tenant has
continued to lease to the present.
2.

Amendments to the lease have been made as follows:
a.

The original lease on the Provo Property was modified for
the principal purpose of building additional space on the

premises for lease to the tenant by way of a Lease
Addendum dated November 1, 1980 between David H. and
Inez H. Allred as owner and Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Company as Tenant.
b.

In 1994, the "First Amendment to Lease Agreement" dated
February 28, 1994, was signed by U.S. West
Communications, Inc. as "Tenant" and Plaintiffs as "Owner"
which extended the term of the Lease to February 28,
1999.

c.

In 1999, the "Second Amendment to Lease Agreement"
dated June 1, 1999 was signed by U.S. West
Communications, Inc. as "Tenant" and Plaintiffs as "Owner"
which extended the terms of the Lease to February 29,
2004.

d.

In 2000, the "Third Amendment to Lease Agreement"
dated June 19, 2000, was signed by Qwest
Communications, Inc. as "Tenant" and the defendant
Trusts as "Owner" which clarified ownership in favor of the
Allred Trusts, among other things.

3.

Plaintiffs conveyed the Provo Property to the Allred Trusts in

December 1982 and February 1983.
4.

Following conveyance of the Provo Property to the Allred Trusts,

plaintiffs continued to receive all rents from the Provo Property and to pay
all expenses of the property and expenses were reimbursed to plaintiffs by
the tenant. Plaintiffs made all mortgage payments due on the property.
5.

In 1992, a dispute had arisen in the family concerning the

validity of the quitclaim deeds and whether in fact the Plaintiffs intended the
deeds to have been executed and recorded. That dispute resulted in several
meetings between Richard G. Allred and his parents. Other meetings
between the Plaintiffs and their children (including Richard G. Allred) were
also held. This dispute also culminated in a number of letters written by
David and Inez Allred to Richard G. Allred.
6.

From at least 1992 forward, plaintiffs demanded return of title

from Defendants on a continual basis.
7.

In a letter with a date of January 25th, 1992, David Allred,

states that " I have asked you several times, Richard, to furnish me with a
copy of the so-called trust agreement covering the Provo property. After it
was executed I never did receive a copy, and I am at a loss to know what is

contained in such . . . Please comply with my request immediately. I am
tired of being put off and ignored with my requests."
8.

In the January 25, 1993 letter from David and Inez Allred to

Richard Allred, Exhibit No. 107, the Plaintiffs make it clear that they have
been bamboozled by their son in regards to the Provo Property. In addition,
the Plaintiffs make it clear that they expected and demanded that their son,
Richard G. Allred, return the Provo Property to them by executing a
quitclaim deed. The Plaintiffs also state that Richard G. Allred's claim that
he didn't dare convey the properties back because then he would be liable to
the beneficiaries was pure hogwash.
9.

In the February 13, 1993 letter, David H. Allred states that if

Richard G. Allred does not sign the quit claim deed returning their Provo
Property to them that he will essentially take his son to church court to deal
with this and other issues.
10.

By 1992, Richard G. Allred, who has the sole trustee of eight of

the trusts and the beneficiary of the ninth trust from 1982 until present, was
well aware that his parents made a claim to the property even though it was
titled in the name of the trusts.

11.

By 1992 and 1993, Richard G. Allred was well aware that his

parents were claiming ownership to the property and that the quitclaim
deeds had been submitted in error or by some kind of fraud or deceit.
12.

From 1994 through 1997, Richard G. Allred was the preparer of

tax returns for David and Inez Allred. In each of those tax returns, David H.
Allred and Inez Allred claimed as income their personal income the rents
from the Provo property.
13.

Those tax returns were prepared by Richard G. Allred on behalf

of his parents as an outside preparer and David and Inez Allred did not
prepare their own returns.
14.

For the period 1994 through 1997, Richard Allred knew very well

that the rents from the Provo Property were included as income on the
Plaintiffs' tax returns because he prepared the tax returns and signed them
as "paid preparer" or as "preparer."
15.

The Allred Trusts knew or should have known from at least by

1994 that plaintiffs claimed the rents as their own property because
defendant Richard G. Allred prepared and signed plaintiffs" tax returns,
signing as a "paid preparer" in 1994, 1996, and 1997, and as "preparer" in
1995. The tax returns prepared by Richard G. Allred for the years 1994,

1995, 1996, and 1997 reported that the rents and expenses related to the
Provo Property belonged to plaintiffs.
16.

Plaintiffs received all rents from the property until August 2000.

17.

Plaintiffs acknowledged receiving $395,814.95 in rent in excess

of amounts paid as mortgage on the property between 1983 and August
2000. Of this amount, $127,800.00 was received during the period from
March 1998 to July 2000.
18.

Starting in 2001, this court ruled that the Allred trusts should

receive the financial benefit from the property, which was rents paid at the
present time by Qwest, but also by its predecessors, the telephone
company, US West and Mountain Bell before that.
19.

The Allred Trusts in their Counterclaim at 1)28 sought an

accounting and a return of funds "to the extent said funds exceed the
amounts paid for the benefit of the Trust beneficiaries . . . ." Plaintiffs
asserted in its pleading that it had paid money for the benefit of the
beneficiaries of the Allred Trusts and was entitled to other offsets and claims
in amounts greater than the amount received net of mortgage payments.
20.

The Allred Trusts have submitted no documents establishing a

contractual basis or obligation to plaintiffs to proceed with an accounting.
Likewise, defendants submitted no evidence establishing plaintiffs otherwise

had agreed or were obliged to provide an accounting. The Allred Trusts
have not presented any alternative basis on which to base a claim for an
accounting either in equity or at law such as wrongful conversion of funds or
any legal duty to account.
21.

In support of her claim for an offset, Inez filed Exhibit No. 821,

which purports to be a statement of $28,406.29 that she gave to or for the
benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust, and as to which she thinks that she
should receive a setoff from $127,800.00, the amount of rents from March
1998 to March 2001 (the period of time acknowledged by the parties as
being three (3) years from when the Defendants).
22.

The majority of the proposed setoffs were simply gifts, either

birthday or Christmas.
23.

The Plaintiffs asserted as one of their affirmative defenses that

the Allred Trusts waived any claim to those rent proceeds.
24.

Richard G. Allred knew that the Allred Trusts were the owners of

the Provo property and as the owners would be entitled to the benefits of
ownership, including rents. This was a matter of considerable discussion
between him and his parents and some very unhappy and angry letters from
his parents.

25.

Despite having knowledge that the Allred Trusts had rights, or at

least could make a claim of ownership to the rents, Richard G. Allred
prepared and signed, as preparer, ("paid preparer" in 1994, 1996, and 1997,
and as "preparer" in 1995) his parents' tax returns in 1994, 1995, 1996 and
1997 in which his parents claimed the rents from the Provo Property as their
own personal income.
26.

Those actions constitute a waiver or relinquishment of a known

27.

The waiver continued into the year 2001 and subsequently

right.

thereafter this lawsuit was filed.
28.

The Allred Trusts are estopped from asserting a claim to the

rents from the Provo Property.
29.

Richard G. Allred, the trustee of eight of the trusts and a

beneficiary of the ninth, participated with the Plaintiffs in reporting the rental
income at issue as the Plaintiffs' personal income. Richard G. Allred knew
that the Plaintiffs where using the rental income from the Provo Property as
their own. The Plaintiffs made a change in their position to their
determinant by using the rental income from the Provo property as their
own with the knowledge of Richard G. Allred.

30.

The Plaintiffs have failed to properly support their laches and

ratification affirmative defenses.
31.

Richard G. Allred claims there was no waiver within the three

years immediately preceding the filing of this lawsuit. However, Richard G.
Allred started the waiver in 1992 and did not take any action to change the
waiver or reassert the Allred Trusts' rights until March 2001. In addition, the
1997 tax return, Exhibit 132, was signed on April 10, 1998.
32.

Richard G. Allred's waiver of the Allred Trusts' rights continued

from 1992 until the counterclaim was filed in March 2001.
33.

The Allred trusts are not entitled to a judgment: against the

Plaintiffs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The statute of limitations on the Allred Trusts' claim for rents is

the three-year statute of limitations found in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26.
2.

The statute of limitations is not tolled by the "discovery rule."

The Court finds that beginning in at least 1992, plaintiffs demanded return of
title to the Provo Property, and that in the years 1994, 1995, 1996, and
1997, Richard G. Allred prepared plaintiffs' tax returns in which it was
reputed that the Provo Property income and expenses was asserted as
belonging to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court finds and concludes the

discovery rule inapplicable in this instance and that the Allred Trusts had
specific and adequate notice of any claim for an accounting it may have had
as early as 1992 and at the very latest in 1994.
3.

The Allred Trusts submitted no documents establishing a

contractual basis or obligation to plaintiffs to proceed with an accounting.
Likewise, there is no evidence establishing plaintiffs otherwise had agreed or
were obliged to provide an accounting. The Allred Trusts have not presented
any alternative basis on which to base a claim for an accounting either in
equity or at law. Plaintiffs, however, acknowledged receiving $395,814.95 in
rent in excess of amounts paid as mortgage on the property between 1983
and August 2000. Based upon the statute of limitations, the Court reduces
this amount to $127,800.00, the amount of rents from the Provo Property
retained by plaintiffs from March 1998 to March 2001, the three years
preceding the Allred Trusts' claim for an accounting.
4.

The Plaintiffs have failed to adequately support their claims for

set-off, laches and ratification.
5.

Richard Allred as the trustee of eight of the trusts and

beneficiary of the ninth trust, waived the rights which the Allred trusts had
to the rents from the Provo property.

6.

The Allred Trusts are estopped from asserting an accounting

claim against David and Inez Allred through the actions of Richard G. Allred,
trustee of eight of the trusts and beneficiary of the ninth trust.
7.

The Allred Trusts are not entitled to any money judgment

against David and Inez Allred.
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant Allred
Trust's accounting counterclaim is barred by waiver and estopppel and that
the Defendant Allred Trusts' accounting counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the issues regarding the order on the
Motion for Award of prejudgment interest are obviated by the above ruling.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the issues regarding the order on the
Motion for reconsideration are obviated by the above ruling.
At the September 22, 2004 hearing, the following motions were
presented to the Court: (1) Defendants' Motion in Limine Precluding
Counter-Defendant From Claiming a Statute of Limitations Defense as to an
Accounting and Restoration of Trust Funds; (2) Defendants' Motion in Limine
to Prohibit the Introduction of Any Evidence of Any Payments to the
Beneficiaries of the Trusts Without Sufficient Documentary Evidence, i.e.
Receipts, Cancelled Checks, Etc.; (3) Defendants' Motion in Limine to

Preclude Plaintiffs from Claiming Credit as a Distribution from the Trust
Proceeds Any Checks that Were Issued to Defendants from Accounts Other
than the Accounts to Which the Rent Proceeds Were Deposited; (4)
Defendants' Motion in Limine to Prohibit Plaintiffs' Claim that Any of the
Payments to Richard Allred and Stephen Allred and Their Families Were
Trust Distributions; (5) Defendants' Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs
from Claiming or Introducing any Evidence of Payments or Credits of Any
Nature to Richard Allred and/or Stephen Allred Prior to the Inception of the
Trusts on December 30, 1982; (6) Defendants' Motion in Limine to Preclude
Introduction of Alleged Property Expenses Taken from Income Tax Returns
of Plaintiffs; and (7) Defendants' Motion in Limine to Preclude Introduction of
Plaintiffs' Documents for Which Privilege was Claimed, and No Production
was Made During the Discovery Process
In conjunction with the above findings of fact and conclusions of law,
the Court further reviewed the motions by the parties and based upon the
briefs submitted, the arguments made, and for good cause appearing,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:
That no motions in limine were granted prior to trial. Each side was
instructed that any objection it wished to make with respect to evidence
presented at trial should be made during trial.

DATED this

i Z day of AwgtJst 2005.
BY THE COURT

Anthon^'vVJ'Sehofiel^.l
District € f c t t J u d g § ^ * \ $
•V
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SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARY A. JENSEN, Trustee for the
DAVID H. ALLRED EXEMPTION
TRUST and the MARY H. ALLRED
SURVIVOR'S TRUST,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RELEASE OF LIS
PENDENS AND FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
RICHARD G. ALLRED, Trustee for THE
RICHARD MARK ALLRED TRUST,
THE ROBERT MATTHEW ALLRED
TRUST, THE MARY MICHELLE
ALLRED TRUST, THE MICHAEL
CHRISTOPHER ALLRED TRUST, THE
STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED TRUST,
THE KAREN ALLRED TRUST, THE
NATHAN ALLRED TRUST, THE MARY
ALLRED TRUST; and MARY LEE
ALLRED, Trustee for THE RICHARD G.
ALLRED TRUST,
Defendants.

Case No. 050402290
Judge Anthony W. Schofield

Plaintiffs' Motion for Release of Lis Pendens and for Summary Judgment came on
regularly for hearing before the Court on November 30, 2005. Defendants Richard G. Allred and
Mary Lee Allred were present with Richard G. Allred representing Defendants. Plaintiffs were
represented by their counsel, Michael R. Carlston of Snow, Christensen & Martineau. Counsel
presented arguments in support of the various Memoranda previouslyfiled,Plaintiffs also
requested award of attorney's fees on the basis of the Utah lis pendens statute. Having reviewed
the briefs, exhibits, and affidavits submitted, the Court heard oral argument on each of the issues
raised in each of the motions, and for good cause appearing,
THE COURT FINDS:
a.

That Defendants' "Notice of Action Pending" recorded with the Davis

County Recorder is a lis pendens within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 and § 78-402.5;
b.

That when Defendants filed their Notice of Action Pending on December

30, 2004, no judgment existed on which Defendants could reasonably rely infilingthe Notice of
Action Pending;
c.

That Defendants had no reasonable basis for filing the Notice of Action

d.

That the fact that a lis pendens had been recorded against the Provo

Pending;

Property in Utah County was irrelevant to whether Defendants were entitled to file a lis pendens
against the Bountiful Property;
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e.

That the records are clear that at the time Defendants recorded the Notice

of Action Pending, the record owners of the Bountiful Property were not parties to the action
pending before this Court in Utah County; and
f.

That according to the Utah lis pendens statute, attorney's fees and costs are

warranted in this matter because Defendants did not have substantial justification for recording
the Notice of Action Pending and no other circumstances exist that would make the imposition of
attorney's fees and costs unjust.

THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS:
a.

That Plaintiffs' Motion for Release of Lis Pendens and for Summary

Judgment is granted;
b.

That Defendants are ordered to timely record with the Davis County

Recorder a release of the Notice of Action Pending;
c.

That should Defendants fail to timely release the Notice of Action

Pending, the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter an order releasing the Notice of Action
Pending; and
d.

That Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is granted and

Plaintiffs are ordered to submit an itemization of attorney's fees and costs within ten (10) days of
the Court executing this Order.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
, \ >&*\iV

DATED this

jZ-day of

"2C06
05.

Honorable ^r^j^^.^chi^Beld
Fourth District £&te***»**"*'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RELEASE OF LIS PENDENS AND FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed,first-class,postage prepaid, on this l*f day of
December, 2005, to the following counsel of record:
Richard G. Allred
1660 West Broadway, Suite 302
Anaheim, California 92802
Mary Lee Allred
1527 Vineyard Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Cory Memmott
Plant, Christensen & Kanell
136 East South Temple #1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

y
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